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Plaintiff-Appellee ) 
vs ) 
JAMES WESTON DECKER, ) Court of Appeals 
) Case No. 990029-CA 
Defendant-Appellant ) 
DESIGNATION OF THE PARTIES 
The Plaintiff-Appellee WEST VALLEY CITY is a Utah 
municipal corporation. [Although the caption of the 
Information is entitled "STATE OF UTAH (West Valley 
City) v. JAMES WESTON DECKER", it is assumed that the 
West Valley City Attorney (or his authorized 
assistants) have filed and prosecuted this case, as a 
violation of state statute, as authorized by Section 
10-3-928, Utah Code.] 
The Defendant-Appellant JAMES WESTON DECKER is a 
natural person, was charged and convicted of two 
misdemeanor offenses, in a bench trial in the Third 
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT 
Jurisdiction of this Court is granted pursuant to 
the provision of Section 78-2a-3(2)(d), Utah Code. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
This appeal and the predicate factual and legal 
situation in which is arose presents the following 
issues: 
1. Whether the trial court erred in failing 
to require a bill of particulars to afford the 
accused reasonable notice of the specific 
offense(s) with which he was charged, because 
the filed Information was so lacking as to 
apprise the Defendant and the Court of the 
precise nature of the charge and the specific 
misconduct related to that charge. 
[Defendant's REQUEST FOR BILL OF PARTICULARS 
filed with the trial court in the RECORD at 
pages 12-13.] 
2. Whether the Information itself actually 
charges a public offense and/or whether the 
evidence adduced at trial actually 
establishes, by proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt, the Defendant's guilt of such "charged" 
offense. [Defendant's "Motion to Arrest 
Judgment" filed with the trial court. RECORD 
at pages 54-57.] 
3 . Whether the Court erred in denying the 
Defendant his right to trial by jury, when a 
written demand was timely filed and served, 
because the Defendant failed to "reconfirm" 
his demand therefor. [Defendant's "Motion to 
Arrest Judgment" filed with the trial court. 
RECORD at pages 54-57.] 
4. Whether the provisions of Section 76-1-
402(3)(b), Utah Code [pertaining to and 
defining "single criminal episode" and 
"attempt" situations] preclude the conviction 
of both "theft" offenses, one of which was 
charged as "attempt". [Defendant's "Motion to 
Arrest Judgment" filed with the trial court. 
RECORD at pages 54-57.] 
A trial court's conclusions of law in criminal 
cases are reviewed for correctness. This standard of 
review has also been referred to as a "correction of 
error standard". The "correction of error" standard 
means that the appellate court decides the matter for 
itself and does not defer in any degree to the trial 
judge's determination of law. State vs Deli, 861 P.2d 
431, 433 (Utah Supreme Court 1993).Whether the trial 
court properly interpreted (or applied) a statute is a 
question of law reviewed for correctness. State vs 
Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Utah Supreme Court 1993); 
State vs James, 819 P.2d 781, 796 (Utah Supreme Court 
1991); State vs Petersen, 810 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah 
Supreme Court 1991); State vs Shipler, 869 P.2d 968, 
969 (Utah Court of Appeals 1994); State vs Simmons, 866 
P.2d 614, 616 (Utah Court of Appeals 1993); Salt Lake 
City vs Emerson, 861 P. 2d 443, 445 (Utah Court of 
Appeals 1993); State vs Phathammavong, 860 P.2d 1001, 
1002 (Utah Court of Appeals 1993); State vs Paul, 860 
P.2d 992, 993 (Utah Court of Appeals 1993). 
An error in a criminal prosecution requires 
reversal when the appellate court concludes that, 
absent the error, there was a reasonable likelihood of 
a result more favorable to the accused. State vs 
Knight, 734 P.2d 913 (Utah Supreme Court 1987). In 
certain circumstances the nature of the error involved 
is such that the burden of convincing the appellate 
court that the error was "harmless" (i.e. that the 
error did not "unfairly prejudice the defense") shifts 
to the prosecution. Knight, supra; State vs Bell, 770 
P. 2d 100 (Utah Supreme Court 1988) . In cases where the 
prosecution fails to convince the appellate court of 
the "harmless" status of the error, remand of the case 
is proper. Bell, supra. 
The trial court has primary responsibility for 
making determinations of fact. State vs Pena, 869 P. 2d 
932 (Utah Supreme Court 1994). A trial court's findings 
of fact in a criminal bench trial are reviewed under a 
"clearly erroneous standard". State vs Goodman, 763 
P. 2d 786 (Utah Supreme Court 1988) . See also Rule 52 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 3 0 of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. A trial court's 
finding as to a factual issue is.clearly erroneous when 
it is against the clear weight of the evidence or, 
although there is evidence to support it, the appellate 
court reviewing all the record evidence is left with a 
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
made. Pena, supra. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
The following provisions may be determinative of 
the issues raised in this appeal: 
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution 
[jury trial and bill of particulars issues] 
Section 7 6-4-101, Utah Code ["attempt" defined] 
Section 76-4-201(3) (b), Utah Code [pertaining 
to "single criminal episode" and "attempt"] 
Section 76-1-402, Utah Code [pertaining to 
"single criminal episode"] 
Section 76-6-405, Utah Code [pertaining to 
"theft by deception"] 
Rule 4, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
[pertaining to "bill of particulars"] 
Rule 17(d), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
[Jury Trial] 
The complete text of these provisions are contained in 
the ADDENDA, at the end of this APPELLANT'S BRIEF. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The appeal of this case involves issues pertaining 
to three distinct "sets" of facts. 
Facts pertaining to alleged underlying criminal 
offense 
On 27 February 1998 the Defendant-
Appellant JAMES W DECKER went to the West 
Valley City Hall and made a request to inspect 
certain "public records" pertaining to certain 
real estate parcels, against which West Valley 
City [hereinafter "the City"] had initiated 
"code enforcement" actions. The public records 
were the two "case files" of the two "cases", 
contained in manila file folders. Candace 
Gleed, Hearings Coordinator of the 
Administrative Code Enforcement program of the 
City, voluntarily surrendered one of the files 
to Mr Decker and allowed him to inspect the 
same a single file in the office foyer of 
the public office. [TRANSCRIPT at Page 57.] 
Ms Gleed testified at trial that Mr 
Decker placed the files on the table, examined 
the documents contained in the files, and 
removed some of the documents from the file 
folder. Ms Gleed and another City employee 
continued to observe Mr Decker. She (Ms Gleed) 
testified that she observed him (Decker) place 
color photographs (snapshots) between two 
"telephone books" which were on the table at 
which Mr Decker was sitting to inspect the 
public records. [TRANSCRIPT at pages 56-63.] 
Per Ms Gleed's testimony, Mr Decker was 
observed to reassemble the case file; he 
thereafter returned the file to Ms Gleed. 
After informing her that he was going to the 
City Treasurer' s office to pay for photocopies 
of the very records he had just inspected, he 
then left the room. [The citizen's right to 
inspect and copy governmental records is 
expressly controlled and authorized by 
statute, including but not limited to Section 
10-3-603 and 63-2-201, Utah Code.] Mr Decker 
paid for the copies and returned to the foyer 
of the Code Enforcement office. [TRANSCRIPT 
at Page 62.] 
During his absence, Ms Gleed had 
unbeknownst to Mr Decker retrieved the 
photographs Mr Decker allegedly placed in 
between the "telephone books" and resecured 
them to the official City file. [TRANSCRIPT at 
Page 64, line 24.] 
From the office foyer table Mr Decker 
then removed two of telephone books. The 
"telephone books" here at issue are the public 
telephone books prepared, printed and 
distributed by Construction Directories 
Company, Incorporated, without charge, to 
telephone customers and other members of the 
public. The suppliers of the telephone books 
generally provide large quantities of the 
telephone books to public offices 
(governmental offices, public libraries, 
utilities offices, etc.) and other "public" 
places, for FREE DISTRIBUTION to members of 
the public: the telephone books are "FREE FOR 
THE TAKING!" The telephone books in question 
were stacked in large quantities in the foyer 
and were for "free public distribution", as is 
customarily the practice by the suppliers of 
the telephone books. [See RECORD at page 65.] 
Mr Decker, seeing the large quantity of 
telephone books there displayed under 
circumstances with which he was familiar, took 
two telephone books, in plain view to the City 
employees and other persons in the foyer area. 
Neither Ms Gleed nor the other City 
employees who were with her in the foyer 
testified they had observed him remove the 
telephone books. [That he took the telephone 
books was admitted by Mr Decker, during 
presentation of the defense portion of the 
case, but only after a motion made at the 
termination of the prosecution's case-in-
chief to dismiss for failure to prove the 
charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt.] 
[TRANSCRIPT at Pages 87-89.] 
Mr Decker was subsequently charged in 
a very vague and ambiguous charging document--
-with two offenses: {D theft by deception; 
and (2) attempted theft. [The charging 
document did not identify the specific 
property to be taken or even the owner of such 
property for each charged offense; the charge 
merely recited the Utah statute.] The case was 
prosecuted by attorneys from the West Valley 
City Attorney's Office. 
Defendant's Request for Bill of Particulars 
Because the filed Information was so 
vague and ambiguous and lacking in factual 
descriptions critical to the Defendant's 
preparation of his defense, the Defendant made 
repeated requests for a "bill of particulars". 
The Prosecuting Attorneys consistently refused 
to provide the same. Eventually, the trial 
judge reversed her earlier decision and 
refused to order a "bill of particulars". That 
the prosecution was allowed to proceed on the 
vague and ambiguous Information which did 
not correlate specific property to the 
specific charge was to have serious adverse 
impact upon the Defendant. First, the 
Defendant was improperly placed at a 
disadvantage because he did not know which 
charge corresponded to which property (i.e. 
photographs or telephone books). Obviously, 
the City Prosecutors thought there were TWO 
distinct offenses, because two offenses were 
charged! Secondly, the two charges were so 
ambiguous and vague that the trial judge 
actually found the defendant guilty of the two 
offenses, exactly opposite of what the 
prosecutors had intended. [The trial judge's 
view of the disputed evidence is contained in 
her statements made at the 14 December 1998 
sentencing hearing.] 
Defendant's request for trial by jury 
In August 1998 the trial court at the 
request of the parties scheduled the trial 
for "jury trial" on 4 November 1998. 
In September 1998 the,Defendant filed a 
timely, written demand for jury trial. A copy 
thereof was served upon the prosecuting 
attorney. [RECORD at 18. ADDENDUM #4.] 
In November two months later the case 
was scheduled for "jury trial". The Court's 
own "docket sheet" for the date of trial 
November 4th clearly indicates the case was 
scheduled for "jury trial". [See ADDENDUM #5. 
See also the computerized "docket history" 
showing the case is scheduled for jury trial. 
ADDENDUM #6] 
On the morning of the trial, Judge Boyden 
refused to convene a jury. She claimed to have 
found that the Defendant had not "re-
confirmed" with the Clerk of the Court his 
earlier demand for jury trial. 
At no time did the Defendant ever 
withdraw his demand for a jury trial or agree 
to be tried by the judge alone. 
The case proceeded as a bench trial, at 
which the Defendant was found guilty of both 
charged offenses. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Defendant's arguments in this appeal are summarized 
as follows: 
1. The Defendant was prejudiced by the trial 
court's failure to order a bill of particulars 
so as to enable him to adequately prepare his 
defense. The pre-trial disclosure (via the 
prosecutor's "open files" actually misled the 
Defendant as to the theory upon which the 
prosecutor was relying. The trial court's 
confusion as to what the evidence actually 
proved (and/or how the statute was to be 
applied) made this failure absolutely 
critical. Utah case law shifts to the 
prosecutor the burden of showing that the 
error was harmless. 
2. The Information itself fails to actually 
state the charged offense. The evidence 
adduced at trial is lacking as to prove, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, the accused's guilt 
of the charged offense. 
3. The trial court erred in denying the 
Defendant his right to trial by jury, when a 
written demand was timely filed and served, 
merely because the Defendant failed to 
"reconfirm" his demand therefor. 
4 . The provisions of Section 76-1-402 (3) (b), 
Utah Code [pertaining to and defining "single 
criminal episode" and "attempt" situations] 
preclude the conviction of both "theft" 
offenses, one of which was charged as 
"attempt". 
5. The prosecution-called witness 
affirmatively stated there was "no deception" 
on her part in allowing the Defendant 
temporary custody of the public records. The 
evidence does not support the verdicts. The 
trial court judge found the evidence "exactly-
backwards" from what the prosecution set out 




THE DEFENDANT WAS UNFAIRLY PREJUDICED BY THE 
TRIAL COURT'S ERROR IN FAILING TO REQUIRE THE 
FILING OF A BILL OF PARTICULARS TO APPRISE THE 
DEFENDANT OF THE REASONABLE NOTICE OF THE 
CHARGED OFFENSES, TO ENABLE HIM TO PREPARE A 
DEFENSE TO THE CHARGES AGAINST HIM. 
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution 
provides in relevant part: 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall 
have the right to appear and defend in person 
and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause 
of the accusation against him, to have a copy 
thereof, . . . 
Emphasis added. 
These constitutional provisions are further 
implemented by Rule 4, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
[The Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure now supersede the 
previous "Rules", adopted by the Legislature and 
formerly codified at 77-35-1 et seq, which statutory 
provisions were repealed in 1989]. Rule 4 provides, in 
relevant part: 
(b) An indictment or information shall charge 
the offense for which the defendant is being 
prosecuted by using the name given to the 
offense by common law or by statute or by 
stating in concise terms the definition of the 
offense sufficient to give the defendant 
notice of the charge. An information may 
contain or be accompanied by a statement of 
facts sufficient to make out probable cause to 
sustain the offense charged where appropriate. 
Such things as time, place, means, intent, 
manner, value and ownership need not be 
alleged, unless necessary to charge the 
offense. Such things as money, securities, 
written instruments, pictures, statutes and 
judgments may be described by any name or 
description by which they are generally known 
or by which they be identified without setting 
forth a copy. However, details concerning such 
things may be obtained through a bill of 
particulars. Neither presumptions of law nor 
matters of judicial notice need be stated. 
(e) When facts not set out in an information 
or indictment are required to inform a 
defendant of the nature and cause of the 
offense charged, so as to enable him to 
prepare his defense, the defendant may file a 
written motion for a bill of particulars. The 
motion shall be filed at arraignment or within 
ten days thereafter, or at such later time as 
the court may permit. The court may, on its 
own motion, direct the filing of a bill of 
particulars. A bill of particulars may be 
amended or supplemented at any time subject to 
such conditions as justice, may require. The 
request for and contents of a bill of 
particulars shall be limited to a statement of 
factual information needed to set forth the 
essential elements of the particular offense 
charged. 
Emphasis added. 
The Information, which forms the basis of this 
prosecution, alleges in relevant part: 
The undersigned, David L. Clark, under oath, 
states on information and belief that the 
defendant, on or about 03/04/98 [amended by 
interlineation to: 2/27/98] , at the vicinity 
of 3 6 00 SOUTH CONSTITUTION BLVD, West Valley 
City, Utah, did unlawfully commit the 
crimes(s) of: 
COUNT l: Attempted Theft. 76-6-404 (Class C) , 
U.C.A. 1953, as amended. A person commits 
theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized 
control over the property of another with a 
purpose to deprive him thereof. 76-6-412. 
Theft - Classification. (1) Theft of property 
and services shall be punishable as follows: 
(d) as a class B misdemeanor if the value of 
the property stolen is less than $300. 
COUNT 2: Theft by Deception. 76-6-405(Class 
B) , U.C.A. 1953, as amended. (1) A person 
commits theft if he obtains or exercises 
control over property of another by deception 
and with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 76-
6-412. Theft - Classification. (1) Theft of 
property and services shall be punishable: (d) 
as a class B misdemeanor if the value of the 
property stolen is less than $300. 
[RECORD at 2. See also ADDENDUM #1, hereto.] 
The Court will, at the outset, note that the 
Information suffers from the following shortcomings: 
1. The Information DOES NOT IDENTIFY the 
specific property alleged to have been stolen 
"by deception" and/or "attempted" to have been 
stolen outright. 
2. The Information DOES NOT IDENTIFY the 
specific owner (victim) of the property. 
3. The Information DOES NOT IDENTIFY the 
specific acts of "deception". 
4. The Information DOES NOT ALLEGE the 
standard allegations (i.e. "acting with the 
kind of culpability otherwise required for the 
commission of the offense, [the defendant] 
engages in conduct constituting a substantial 
step toward commission of the offense") 
necessary to allege the "attempted theft" 
charge. 
5. The Information DOES ALLEGE, facially, 
that BOTH charged crimes occurred on the same 
date and at the same time. [This information, 
together with the statements contained within 
the "Probable Cause Statement", should have 
alerted the trial court judge that both 
incidents were a "single criminal episode", 
for which the ramifications for the Defendant 
and for the Court would prove to be 
significant.] 
The Information merely recited the text of the 
statutes; such a practice has been condemned by the 
Utah Supreme Court. See State vs Bell, 770 P. 2d 100 
(Utah Supreme Court 1988), discussed below. 
On 23 July 1998 the Defendant filed a written 
"REQUEST FOR BILL OF PARTICULARS", in which he 
specifically sought: 
1. What is the specific property alleged to 
have been stolen by the Defendant in Count I 
of the Information filed herein? 
2. What is the specific property alleged to 
have been stolen by the Defendant in Count II 
of the Information filed herein? 
3. What is the specific allegation of 
deception with which the Defendant is charged 
in Count II of the Information filed herein? 
[RECORD at 12. See ADDENDUM #2, herein.] 
Although the "Bill of Particulars" issue was argued 
and debated by the parties, no formalized "bill of 
particulars" was ever provided. The trial court did not 
mandate the creation or production of the "bill of 
particulars" responding to the Defendant's specific 
inquiry. Rather, the prosecution allowed the Defendant 
"open file" access to the prosecutor's case file. The 
trial court's failure to require the "bill of 
particulars" responses to the Defendant's specific 
inquiry is significant. 
In this case, the Defendant's contention is NOT 
what he did. The Defendant knows exactly what he did. 
The request for the bill of particulars is significant 
because it forces the prosecution (1) to allege an 
offense AND (2) to prove that offense. That didn't 
happen here. 
Pursuant to the "open files" inspection, the 
Defendant and/or his trial counsel was allowed to 
examine the "WEST VALLEY CITY ATTORNEY SCREENING 
SHEET", referring to the incident. The two charges are 
described. Opposite the two charges, as handwritten by 
the prosecutor "screening" the case for prosecution, 
are the similarly-handwritten descriptions of the two 
items alleged to have been taken, as follows: 
THEFT BY DECEPTION phone books 
ATT. THE FT pictures 
[See ADDENDUM #3.] 
Indeed, this prosecutorial "theory" under which the 
case was screened and tried was more-or-less consistent 
with what the Defendant would have expected. [That this 
is exactly the prosecutor's view of the case is 
CONFIRMED by the Plaintiff's attorney's statement 
contained in the 24 March 1999 Plaintiff's Memorandum 
in Support of Sua Sponte Motion for Summary Dispostion, 
pageG, as follows: "He [Decker] was charged with the 
attempted theft of photographs, and with theft by 
deception of telephone books."] Because the pictures 
were actually NOT TAKEN, the pictures (snapshots) had 
to be the subject of the "attempted theft" charge. 
Similarly, because the "for free distribution" 
telephone books WERE TAKEN, those telephone books had 
to be the subject of the "theft by deception" charge. 
Notwithstanding those disclosures, the prosecution 
was nevertheless still allowed to proceed to trial 
without having identified the specific property to have 
been taken, the specific owner of the property, and 
without identifying the specific "deception" alleged. 
In this regard, as it turns put, this "open files 
disclosure" still works to the procedural and 
substantive detriment of the Defendant who was misled 
into defending on a charge that wasn't really the 
charge; that's the very mischief a "bill of 
particulars" is designed to prevent and had the 
Defendant's three simple questions been answered, in 
writing, we perhaps would not have this problem. 
Of course, there was reason to fail to allege that 
the phone books were the property of West Valley City, 
because they weren't: the phone books were the property 
of CONSTRUCTION DIRECTORIES COMPANY, INCORPORATED, and 
had been delivered in large quantities for "FREE 
DISTRIBUTION" to members of the public. If the City had 
to allege another "owner" of the property, then the 
City would have had to call a representative of that 
owner who would have had to testify. At that juncture 
the entire case would collapse, because that outside 
witness (from Construction Directors) would have 
confirmed that the directories were for "free 
distribution". Thus, the prosecution had reason to 
intentionally fail to disclose the "victim". 
When the case was actually tried, Judge Boyden 
not necessarily privy to the prosecutor's "screening 
worksheet" actually found the Defendant guilty of 
both offenses, but exactly opposite of what was 
charged! Thus, the Defendant was intentionally misled 
into defending against charges not precisely identified 
in the Information, as follows: the trial judge found 
the defendant guilty of the "theft by deception" charge 
as related to the photographs and the "attempted theft" 
charge as related to the telephone books. 
The trial court's confusion (as to the requirements 
of the statute AND the evidentiary proof presented at 
trial) is manifest by the comments of Judge Boyden at 
the December 14th sentencing, as follows: 
THE COURT: . . . As to the finding of guilty 
on the two separate offenses, there were facts 
presented that showed the two separate thefts 
so I am also denying your motion to arrest 
judgment as to the fact that one is a lesser 
included offense. One was talking about the 
actual removal of the photographs from a file 
and in a deceptive manner put hidden in a 
magazine, left there. The facts show that Mr 
Decker left the office and then came back in 
and took the magazines in which he had placed 
the pictures and the facts show that deception 
was being used to exercise unauthorized 
control over those pictures. It doesn't 
require that he actually leave with them. The 
exercising of the unauthorized control was 
what the facts found and that was the basis of 
my conviction on that. So, I'm also denying it 
on that matter. 
TRANSCRIPT OF 14 December 1998 SENTENCING HEARING, page 
8. RECORD at 71.] Emphasis added. The Court later 
commented: 
THE COURT: My finding is that the exercise of 
control, unauthorized control over the 
pictures, and then hiding tjie pictures is the 
deception that was used and the theft is the 
exercised [sic] of unauthorized control over 
those pictures by hiding them in the book and 
that is the deception. So, my finding is that 
the elements of theft by deception in that he 
hid the property after exercising unauthorized 
control over those was my finding and that's 
the distinction. Both of those I think now are 
on the record and will be the basis for any 
appellate issues. 
TRANSCRIPT OF 14 DECEMBER 1998 SENTENCING, pages 11-12. 
Record at 71] Emphasis added. 
That the trial court had this so mixed up indicates 
the problems with proceeding without the "bill of 
particulars" which was so consistently sought and 
pleaded for. 
The telephone books were "free" for the asking. 
They were publicly displayed. They were "given away" by 
city employees. TRANSCRIPT, page 68, lines 12-14. 
The prosecution's failure to provide a bill of 
particulars is significant. Not only did the Defendant 
not know the specific conduct he was charged with, but 
the Judge was also confused, as evidenced by her 
expressed comments at the December 14th sentencing, as 
shown by the Transcript thereof. 
The Information filed against the Defendant merely 
recited the brief text of the statute itself. There was 
no attempt made to "personalize" the offense or conform 
the charge to the accused's actual conduct. [On the 
"attempted theft" charge, the charge does NOT quote 
from the statute pertaining to "attempt", but merely 
recites the straight-up "theft" provision, as though 
the offense were completely consummated!] The 
Information contains no description of the property 
over which "unauthorized control" was exercised; this 
defect has had severe adverse results upon the accused. 
The trial judge actually found him guilty of the 
offense opposite to what the prosecutor had charged 
(and ostensibly was seeking to prove): the Defendant 
was found guilty of both offenses: "theft by deception" 
of the photos, even those photographs were not taken 
from the premises! Thus, the "attempted theft" charge 
must have applied to the telephone books, which 
arguably the evidence circumstantially showed were 
taken from the premises! This incongruous result was 
certainly not anticipated; a better-pleaded Information 
(or the requested bill of particulars) would have had 
a different result! 
The decision of the Utah Supreme Court in the case 
of State vs Bell, 770 P. 2d 100 (Utah Supreme Court 
1988) is so precisely on point in the instant situation 
that detailed scrutiny of the case and its holding are 
warranted. In Bell the defendant appealed from a 
conviction of racketeering by means of drug 
trafficking. The defendant asserted that he was not 
given sufficiently detailed notice of the charges 
against him to enable him to prepare a defense. The 
Utah Supreme Court reversed the conviction and remanded 
for a new trial. 
In Bell the Utah Supreme Court wrote: 
Bell argues that the inadequate notice 
given on this point prejudiced his ability to 
prepare a defense, thus denying him the right 
to notice guaranteed by the Utah Constitution 
and by Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 4. 
The State argues that Bell was put on 
notice of the factual basis for the enterprise 
allegations by various documents, other than 
the indictment and the bill of particulars, 
and by information presented during various 
pretrial hearings. 
Article I, section 12 of the Utah 
Constitution guarantees, "In criminal 
prosecutions the accused shall have the right 
. . . to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him [and] to have a copy 
thereof." Utah Const, art I, §12. In State v. 
Fulton, 742 P.2d 1208 (Utah 1987), cert, 
denied, U.S. , 108 S. Ct. 777, 98 L. Ed. 2d 
864 (1988) , we explained that this provision 
requires 'that the accused be given sufficient 
information is so that he (or she) can know 
the particulars of the alleged wrongful 
conduct and can adequately prepare his [or 
her) defense.'" Id. at 1214 (quoting State v. 
Burnett, 712 P.2d 260, 262 (Utah 1985)); see 
also State v. Taylor, 14 Utah 2d 107, 108, 378 
P.2d 352, 353 (1963); State v. Myers, 5 Utah 
2d 365, 372, 302 P.2d 276, 280 (1956). 
Fulton also explained that this 
constitutional right to notice is normally 
implemented through Utah Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 4, which governs, inter alia, the 
contents of information, indictments, and 
bills of particulars. See 742 P.2d at 1214; 
Utah R. Crim. P. 4 (codified at Utah Code 
Ann. §77-35-4 (1982)). Rule 4 (b)6 provides 
for the commencement of a criminal action by 
filing an information or indictment. Although 
an information may be accompanied by a fact 
statement detailing the prosecution's 
contentions in support of the charges, an 
information or indictment is legally 
sufficient even if it consists of nothing more 
than an extremely summary statement of the 
charge that would not provide the accused with 
sufficient particulars to prepare an adequate 
defense. Fulton, 742 P.2d at 1214; Utah R. 
Crim. P. 4(b). When an indictment or 
information legally sufficient under rule 4 (b) 
does not provide the notice guaranteed by 
article I, section 12, the accused may request 
a bill of particulars under rule 4(e). Once 
such a request is made, the accused is 
entitled to receive, and the State has the 
burden of providing, a written bill of 
particulars which, in conjunction with the 
indictment or information, gives notice of the 
particulars of the charges in sufficient 
factual detail to enable the accused to 
prepare an adequate defense. Fulton, 742 P. 2d 
at 1214; State v. Robbins, 709 P.2d 771, 773 
(Utah 1985); Utah R. Crim. P. 4(e). 
770 P.2d at 103-104. Emphasis added. Citations to 
footnotes omitted. 
In Bell the Supreme Court was critical of the 
indictment which "merely repeated verbatim the broad, 
vague language of the RICE statute without describing 
any facts or circumstances constituting the crime 
charged other than a statement that the crime had been 
committed". Id at 104. In Bell, the Supreme Court 
concluded: 
This indictment met the minimal standards 
of rule 4(b), see Fulton, 742 P.2d at 1208, 
but by no stretch of the imagination did it 
provide Bell with sufficient notice of the 
facts underlying the charges to enable him to 
prepare an adequate defense. 
Id. at 104-105. Emphasis added. Text contained in 
footnote omitted. The Court continued: 
The next question is whether Bell 
exercised his right to seek more particular 
notice by requesting a bill of particulars 
under rule 4(e) and, thus, preserved his claim 
of error. Bell did submit a timely request 
that the State provide a bill of particulars 
describing the factual basis for the element 
of racketeering activity and specifically 
explaining 'what enterprise is alleged as 
being involved." Therefore, under rule 4(e), 
the State had the burden of providing an 
adequate bill of particulars. 
The final question is whether the State 
met that burden. The answer is that it did 
not. At first, the State ignored Bell's 
request. Bell then secured a court order 
directing that the bill be provided. 
• • • 
. . . Under rule 4(e), a bill of 
particulars must contain sufficient "factual 
information . . . to set forth the essential 
elements of the particular offense charged." 
The ultimate test of the adequacy of such a 
statement, as noted above, is that the accused 
be enabled to prepare a defense. 
The record shows that at trial, the State 
presented three theories as to who or what 
factually constituted the enterprise: Bell as 
an individual, the group of persons associated 
with Molly Kingston, or Bell's convenience 
store. By no stretch of the imagination could 
the single enigmatic sentence in paragraph 3 
of the State's reply to Bell's request be 
construed as containing sufficient factual 
information to describe the State's actual 
theories of this essential element of the 
crime, much less to permit Bell to prepare his 
defense on this element.11 Although Bell 
persistently objected to the inadequacy of the 
bill of particulars, the State refused to 
amend or supplement the bill as it would have 
been permitted to do under rule 4(e). The 
State failed to meet the burden of notice 
imposed on it by rule 4(e), and the trial 
court's failure to enforce this requirement 
was clearly error under the plain language of 
rule 4 (e) , as well as the standards described 
in Fulton. 
The Supreme Court in Bell found the error 
to be prejudicial, as analyzed under Rule 3 0 
standards. The Bell court wrote: 
Under rule 30, an error in a criminal 
prosecution requires reversal when we conclude 
that, absent the error, there was a reasonable 
likelihood of a result more favorable to the 
accused. State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 
919-21 (Utah 1987). Phrased differently, the 
test is whether our confidence in the outcome 
of the trial is eroded. Id. at 920. Applying 
the erosion of confidence test to a failure to 
give adequate notice of charges, we first ask 
how the error impeded the accused's ability to 
prepare for trial and to meet the State's 
case. At trial, the State presented three 
alternative theories as to what constituted 
the essential element of an enterprise. The 
specific question, then, is whether the 
State's failure to notify Bell of these three 
factual bases for the allegations of a RICE 
enterprise so impeded his ability to prepare 
a defense to those allegations as to require 
a reversal under rule 30. 
Ordinarily, the practical effect of the 
standard imposed by rule 3 0 is to place on the 
accused the burden of persuading this Court 
that, in light of all the circumstances 
revealed through the record as a whole, there 
is a reasonable likelihood that the trial 
result would have been more favorable absent 
the error. See Knight, 734 P.2d at 919-21; 
State v. Jones, 657 P.2d 1263, 1267 (Utah 
1982) ; State v. Hamilton, 18 Utah 2d 234, 239, 
419 P.2d 770, 773 (1966). However, as we 
stated in Knight, in some circumstances the 
nature of the error involved is such that this 
de facto burden should be shifted and the 
State required to persuade us that the error 
was harmless. 734 P.2d at 920-21. In Knight, 
the prosecution violated the rules of 
discovery by failing to provide the accused 
with certain evidence prior to trial. We 
first found that because of the nature of the 
error, it was difficult for this Court to 
determine from the record whether Knight might 
have been able to prepare a better defense and 
achieve a more favorable result at trial if 
the prosecution had not breached its discovery 
obligations. Id. at 920. We then held that 
under such circumstances, if the accused could 
make a credible argument that the prosecutor's 
errors impaired the defense, it would be 
appropriate "to place the burden on the State 
to persuade a court that the error did not 
unfairly prejudice the defense. " Id. at 920-21. 
We are faced with analogous circumstances 
in this case. First, as in Knight, the record 
"cannot reveal how [adequate notice of the 
charges] would have affected the actions of 
defense counsel, either in preparing for trial 
or in presenting the case to the jury." Id. at 
920. Second, Bell has met the requirement of 
making ma credible argument that the 
prosecutor's errors have impaired the 
defense." Id. at 921. 
In Knight, we noted that in assessing 
whether the defendants argument of 
prejudicial impairment rang sufficiently true 
to warrant shifting the burden of persuasion 
to the State, we would take into account the 
centrality of the matter affected by the 
prosecutors errors. Id. In this case, the 
error involved an essential element of 
the-crime charged. Clearly Bell's defense to 
the State's case on the element of an 
enterprise was central to the outcome, and 
therefore, the error "assumes heightened 
importance when evaluating whether the defense 
might have been impaired." Id. Bell contends 
that the prosecution's failure to sufficiently 
notify him of the factual basis for its 
allegations left him unable to make pretrial 
preparation for a defense or to counter the 
State's evidence and arguments at trial. 
Given the plausibility of this contention and 
the critical nature of the issue involved, we 
conclude that Bell has made a credible 
argument that his defense was impaired by the 
error. 
Under Knight, then, we place on the State 
the burden of persuading us that the error was 
harmless under the standard of rule 30. The 
State makes only one argument in attempting to 
meet this burden. It argues that Bell was not 
prejudiced because he was effectively put on 
notice of the State's various theories of what 
constituted the element of an enterprise 
through the course of certain pretrial 
proceedings. The State refers to a complaint 
filed in a separate proceeding seeking 
forfeiture of Bell's convenience store,13 to 
an in-court discussion at a hearing on that 
forfeiture complaint, and to materials 
provided to Bell through pretrial discovery, 
including transcripts of grand jury witnesses' 
testimony and transcripts of telephone 
conversations recorded pursuant to a wiretap 
order. The State argues that through reading 
the indictment and bill of particulars in the 
context of these other sources of information, 
Bell must have gotten adequate notice of the 
charges. 
This argument fails. Our review of the 
record leaves us unconvinced that Bell did in 
fact receive adequate notice through these 
convoluted means. None of the sources pointed 
to by the State explicitly laid out the three 
enterprise theories later presented at trial. 
Nor do we think that the three allegations are 
necessarily implicit in these sources of 
information, even when they are taken as a 
whole. Thus, the State has failed to meet its 
burden. 
Also, we think it important to clarify 
that we reject the implication of the State's 
argument: that the State, having failed to 
provide even a minimally adequate bill of 
particulars despite persistent requests from 
Bell, can excuse that failure under the guise 
of harmless error by claiming that Bell had 
pretrial access to a mass of various items of 
information from which, one can conclude in 
hindsight, Bell could have gleaned the State's 
theories for the essential elements of the 
crimes charged. For this Court to accept such 
an argument would not only vitiate the 
specific requirements of rule 4 (e), it would 
negate the accused's constitutional right, 
implemented by rule 4(e), to "have a copy" of 
a document setting out in clear terms "the 
nature and cause of the accusation." Utah 
Const, art. I, § 12; State v. Fulton, 742 
P. 2d at 1214. A defendant, having complied 
with the procedural requirements of rule 4 (e) 
in requesting a bill of particulars, ought not 
to have to look beyond the indictment or 
information and the bill of particulars to 
obtain sufficient notice of the specific 
allegations to be faced at trial. 
The State has not met its Knight burden 
of persuading this Court that the failure to 
provide an adequate bill of particulars did 
not unfairly prejudice Bell's ability to 
prepare and present a defense. Therefore, we 
reverse Bell's conviction and remand for a new 
trial with instructions that Bell be given an 
adequate bill of particulars. 
Emphasis added. 770 P. 2d at 105-107. Emphasis added. 
Text contained in footnotes omitted. 
The analysis and holding of Bell are dispositive 
of the case at bar. The prosecution chose the ambiguous 
wording of the Information. When requested for a bill 
of particulars asking three simple things, the 
Plaintiff's attorney's "stonewalled" the Defendant by 
refusing to provide the written "bill of particulars", 
specifically responding to his three cogent questions. 
The trial court's involvement did not make things 
better; ultimately, the prosecution provided for the 
"open files", but that only misled the Defendant and 
his counsel, because the court found the Defendant 
"guilty" of the exact opposite charges the prosecutors 
thought they had charged. 
The Court of Appeals should reverse the 
convictions, order the creation and service of a bill 
of particulars, and remand the case for a jury trial. 
II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE DEFENDANT 
HIS RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY WHEN A WRITTEN 
DEMAND THEREFOR WAS TIMELY FILED AND SERVED 
In the year 1215 at Runnymede, in Surrey near 
London, England, King John signed and sealed the Magna 
Carta Libertatum the Great Charter of Liberties to 
establish the rule of law within the realm. For almost 
eight centuries the Magna Carta has been one of the 
major cornerstones within Anglo-American jurisprudence . 
Central to the Magna Carta's numerous provisions 
was the concept that an accused person would be 
entitled to the "judgment of one's peers1'! The "right" 
to a jury trial was thus guaranteed! That "judgment of 
one's peers" was not merely for the purpose of 
determining punishment after conviction, but 
determining the accused's guilt or innocence in the 
first instance! 
The trial court's denial of the timely-requested 
"jury trial" deprived the Defendant of his 
constitutional rights. 
Although there are "federal" court cases holding 
that a jury trial is not mandated by the federal 
constitution for trials involving "petty offenses", 
see, e.g. Lewis vs United States, 518 US 322, 116 SCt 
2163 (1996) , Blanton vs City of North Las Vegas, 489 US 
538, 109 SCt 1289 (1989), and Duncan vs Louisiana, 391 
Utah 145 (1968) , the specifics of the charges filed 
against the Defendant puts the "federal" standard in a 
different light. We have, in this case, a SINGLE 
INCIDENT OF CONDUCT, consisting of at-the-most perhaps 
five minutes of activity, over a geographic "range" 
measured in a few feet (limited to a single room), by 
a singular person acting alone. It is, as defined by 
Utah statute, as "a single-criminal episode", for which 
that statute PRECLUDES multiple punishments. 
Nevertheless, the prosecution has alleged and the trial 
court has accepted prosecution of TWO offenses ["theft" 
(by deception) and "attempted theft"] , even though the 
statute affirmatively and unambiguously commands such 
should not be done! The consolidated result is to 
charge, effectively, "one" offense, for which the 
maximum prescribed penalty is 9 months' incarceration--
-above the "threshold" for a "petty offense". 
The "jury trial" had been scheduled from the date 
of August 19th, as indicated by the computerized court 
records. [See ADDENDUM #4] . [The court's scheduling of 
the "jury trial" appears to have been a concession to 
the Defendant's "oral" request, to be followed up with 
by the "written demand". That written demand was filed 
with the Court on September 8th. See RECORD at 18. See 
ADDENDUM #3.] Even on the morning of trial, the Court's 
"daily docket" posted on the bulletin board outside the 
courtroom shows the case is scheduled for "jury trial". 
Defendant had obtained replacement legal counsel in 
anticipation of a "jury trial". 
Then, on the morning of trial, because the Court 
had NOT called the jury as demanded some two months 
before, is unconscionable! Although there had been 
considerable involvement with the Court and with the 
prosecutor in the two months immediately before the 
trial, neither the prosecutor nor the Court gave even 
a hint that the "jury trial" would not be granted! 
The self-described "policy" [SENTENCING TRANSCRIPT 
at Page 7, line 12. RECORD at 71.] of the West Valley 
Department of the Third District Court to require 
"confirmation" of the jury demand, even after the 
written demand has been submitted, or else the jury 
will not be called, cannot be condoned or construed to 
be valid? The statute and the rules don't require such; 
the Rules merely require a "written demand", filed ten 
days before trial. To allow the Court to ignore the 
Defendant's timely-filed demand, merely because the 
Court has not called the jury, is unconscionable. It 
should not be condoned. 
The Record is silent why this case proceeded to 
trial, sans jury, when the other two cases one of 
which is a "Class A" misdemeanor prosecution were 
similarly scheduled for "jury trial" that morning, at 
the same time. 
The undersigned counsel is aware of this Court's 
holding in the case of West Valley City vs McDonald, 
948 P.2d 371 (Utah Court of Appeals 1997), with regard 
to the right to trial by jury. The holding in McDonald 
is misguided and unfortunate. First, McDonald involved 
a traffic offense (i.e. speeding), charged as an 
infraction! By statute, there is no right to trial by 
jury in an "infraction" case. Thus, that is all that 
should have been said. All of the language of McDonald 
opinion concerning "petty offenses" and the 
"constitutional right" is merely obiter dicta. It is 
unfortunate that the Court of Appeals would involve 
itself with "constitutional" adjudication arguably 
applicable now to the full-range of criminal 
defendants when the defendant in McDonald was merely 
charged with a $50 "infraction". The significant 
jurisprudential principles behind McDonald should be 
re-examined! The McDonald "holding" (sic) should be 
reversed! 
Although McDonald holds there is no constitutional 
right to a jury trial in "petty offenses" (for which 
the charged offense is less than 6 months' possible 
incarceration), the trial court's EXPRESS GRANTING of 
the jury trial demand (on August 2 0th, as evidenced by 
the Court's own computerized minutes) and the trial 
court's view of the two charged offenses which should 
have precluded the "attempt" conviction, are such as to 
override the McDonald prescription. 
The Defendant timely requested a "jury trial". The 
trial court even scheduled the case for "jury trial". 
The Defendant hired replacement counsel to assist him 
at the jury trial. Merely because the trial court 
neglects (or refuses) to then call the jury cannot be 
grounds to deny the Defendant his constitutional right! 
Such arbitrary and capricious conduct on the part of 
the trial court judge cannot be condoned! 
Ill 
"SINGLE-CRIMINAL EPISODE" PROVISIONS PRECLUDE 
CONVICTION OF BOTH OFFENSES 
The trial judge found the Defendant "guilty" of 
BOTH ambiguously-charged offenses, arising out of the 
same action, occurring at the same time and in the same 
geographical vicinity, and given the prosecution's 
theory of the case against the same victim! 
The announced "guilty" findings (verdicts) on BOTH 
the "attempted theft" and the "theft by deception" 
charge contradict the provisions of Section 76-1-402, 
Utah Code. Given the prosecution's characterization of 
the meaning of the "single criminal episode" statute, 
a person intending to steal Item #A AND Item #B, but 
only actually succeeding stealing Item #A could 
nevertheless be additionally punished (under the 
"attempt" statute) for conduct not actually consummated 
(because Item #B was NOT stolen) ! This incongruity was 
expressly proscribed by the Legislature. 
"Attempted theft" is a lesser included offense of 
the offense of "theft", which offense is per Section 
76-6-403, Utah Code a "single offense embracing the 
separate offenses" of historically-distinct offenses. 
"Theft" is "theft", regardless of the manner in which 
it was conducted, as said conduct is described by 
statute, including the "theft by deception" charge 
under Section 76-6-405. The Defendant cannot be 
punished (with a sentence for two convictions), when in 
fact there should be a single conviction of a single 
offense, arising out of what was, in legal terms not 
admitted by the Defendant, a "single criminal episode"! 
Viewed in a light most favorable to the prevailing 
party, the evidence shows the Defendant took the phone 
books. That he was successful in one aspect of a theft 
does not allow a second charge of "attempted theft" to 
be added (for enhanced sentencing purposes), so that 
the Defendant can be convicted of both offenses. Per 
Section 76-1-402(3), Utah Code, the Defendant may be 
convicted ONLY of the basic "theft" offense. 
Thus, before the Court at the conclusion of the 
trial was conceptually but a single charge: "theft by 
deception" . Was that offense proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt? No. There was no deception. The City's witnesses 
acknowledged that they voluntarily surrendered to him 
temporary custody of the photographs. 
The theft of the photographs was physically 
prevented by the City's witnesses: those officials 
removed the photographs, thus preventing the theft. 
Thus, there could be no effective "theft" (by 
deception, or otherwise), there could be only an 
"attempted theft" of the photographs. 
Obviously, the evidence was confusing at best and, 
at worst, certainly not "proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt". The trial judge was confused as to the status 
of the proof, as evidenced by her subsequent comments. 
At the Sentencing Hearing on December 14th, it was 
apparent from the comments of Judge Boyden that she 
believed that the "theft by deception" charge pertained 
to the photographs. [See "SENTENCING TRANSCRIPT at 
pages 8 and 11] . And yet the photographs were not 
actually taken; the "photos" could only pertain to the 
"attempt" charge. Thus, the telephone books were the 
basis for the "theft by deception" charge. Yet there 
was no deception. 
The trial judge actually found directly opposite: 
in the Judge's mind, the "theft by deception" charge 
pertained to the photographs. Thus, by implication, the 
"attempted theft" charge had to relate to the telephone 
books. 
Obviously, that's inappropriate because the 
"attempted theft" was for the photos. The telephone 
books WERE, in fact, taken out the door and were not 
recovered. [Although technically the prosecution may, 
theoretically, "undercharge" an offense, that is not 
what happened here. The "photos" were to be the 
"attempt" (because the City officials' physical removal 
of the photos from the telephone books precluded there 
actual removal. The prosecutors thought (and have so 
stated to this Court) that the "theft by deception" 
pertained to the telephone books!] 
Mr Decker was "guilty" of ONLY an "attempt". The 
"deception" found by the trial judge is now what the 
statute requires. 
The announced "guilty" finding (verdict) on the 
"attempted theft" and the "theft by deception" charge 
contradicts the provisions of Section 76-1-402, Utah 
Code. "Attempted theft" is a lesser included offense of 
the offense of "theft", which offense is per Section 
76-6-403, Utah Code a "single offense embracing the 
separate offenses" of historically-distinct offenses. 
"Theft" is "theft", regardless of the manner in which 
it was conducted, as said conduct is described by 
statute, including the "theft by deception" charge 
under Section 76-6-405. The Defendant cannot be 
punished (with a sentence for two convictions), when in 
fact there should be a single conviction of a single 
offense, arising out of what was, in legal terms not 
admitted by the Defendant, a "single criminal episode"! 
Section 76-1-402(3), Utah Code, provides in 
relevant part: 
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an 
offense included in the offense charged, but 
may not be convicted of both the offense 
charged and the included offense. An offense 
is so included when: 
• • • 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, 
solicitation, conspiracy, or form of 
preparation to commit the offense 
charged or an offense otherwise 
included therein; 
In the instant proceeding, the City charged two 
offenses: 
1. Theft by deception AND 
2. Attempted theft. 
The "facts" surrounding the alleged "theft" 
incident viewed in a light most favorable to the 
prevailing party (the City) is basically the 
following: 
The Defendant attempted to hide the 
photographs AND the Defendant left the 
premises with the telephone books in hand. 
The actions of the Defendant were but one "single 
criminal episode". [This particular theory of the 
commission of the alleged offenses has to be the 
prosecutions view thereof; otherwise the case falls 
apart: there is no "substantial preparation" and the 
City loses the "theft by deception". While the 
Defendant hesitates to utilize the terminology "single 
criminal episode", because such terminology is implies 
criminality to his conduct, the statute utilizes that 
term. The term is utilized herein for analytical 
purposes.] Viewed in a light most favorable to the 
prevailing party, the evidence shows the Defendant took 
the phone books. That he was successful in one aspect 
of a theft does not allow a second charge of "attempted 
theft" to be added (for enhanced sentencing purposes), 
so that the Defendant can be convicted of both 
offenses. Per Section 76-1-402(3), Utah Code, the 
Defendant may be convicted only of the initial offense. 
Mr Decker was "guilty" of only an "attempt" 
That the trial court had this so mixed up indicates 
the problems with proceeding without the "bill of 
particulars" which was so consistently sought and 
pleaded for. 
IV 
THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE VERDICT 
The witnesses for the prosecution testified they 
observed the Defendant place the two photographs inside 
(or between) the telephone books; he, on the other 
hand, testified that the papers and photographs from 
the City's file were spread over the table, and that if 
the photographs were inadvertently intermingled with 
the telephone books, such was not indicative of 
criminal behavior, but merely innocent inadvertence and 
neglect. In this context, the Prosecution has not 
alleged or proven that the Defendant, "acting with 
the kind of culpability otherwise required for the 
commission of the offense, engages in conduct 
constituting a substantial step toward commission of 
the offense", as required by Section 76-4-101(1), Utah 
Code. Furthermore, Section 76-4-101(2) is even more 
demanding, by stating: 
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct does 
not constitute a substantial step unless it is 
strongly corroborative of the actors intent to 
commit the offense. 
Emphasis added. With regard to the photographs, the is 
no evidence of "strongly corroborative" evidence 
showing, beyond a reasonable doubt, a "substantial step 
towards commission of the offense" by the Defendant 
"acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required 
for the commission of the offense", as the statute 
requires. 
Under the prosecution's "theory" obviously not 
understood or followed by the trial judge the 
placement of the photographs within or between the two 
telephone books might have been "a substantial step", 
except for the fact that the telephone books were 
"free", for "free distribution" to the public. The 
prosecution cannot "bootstrap" itself in a "theory" (of 
guilt) by showing the placement of the pictures between 
the telephone books, and then ignore the implications 
of the status of those telephone books: i.e. that it 
was essential that the telephone books be "free" for 
taking, or else how would the Defendant have "by 
deception" effected the theft. Without the telephone 
books being "free" for the taking, the other conduct 
(i.e. misplacing the photographs) has no "criminal" 
significance. The telephone books had to be "free", so 
as to enable the Defendant to take them from the room 
without suspicion. That being the case, the prosecution 
cannot advance a conflicting theory which says those 
telephone books were "the property of West Valley City" 
[which they weren't]. 
The telephone books had been delivered at the City, 
for subsequent "free" distribution to members of the 
public. The two telephone books which were placed in 
the "code enforcement" office of West Valley were not--
-as the Plaintiff's attorney has stated [page 
The telephone books were "free" for the taking, by 
citizens. They were publicly displayed. 
Section 76-6-401, Utah Code, providing for certain 
"definitions" pertinent to "theft" offense, provides in 
relevant part: 
(5) "Deception" occurs when a person 
intentionally: 
(a) Creates or confirms by words or 
conduct an impression of law or fact 
that is false and that the actor 
does not believe to be true and that 
is likely to affect the judgment of 
another in the transaction; or 
(b) Fails to correct a false 
impression of law or fact that the 
actor previously created or 
confirmed by words or conduct that 
is likely to affect the judgment of 
another and that the actor does not 
now believe to be true; or 
(c) Prevents another from acquiring 
information likely to affect his 
judgment in the transaction; or 
(d) Sells or otherwise transfers or 
encumbers property without 
disclosing a lien, security 
interest, adverse claim, or other 
legal impediment to the enjoyment of 
the property, whether the lien, 
security interest, claim, or 
impediment is or is not valid or is 
or is not a matter of official 
record; or 
(e) Promises performance that is 
likely to affect the judgment of 
another in the transaction, which 
performance the actor does not 
intend to perform or knows that will 
not be performed; provided, however, 
that failure to perform the promise 
in issue without other evidence of 
intent or knowledge is not 
sufficient proof that the actor does 
not intend to perform or knew the 
promise would not be performed. 
Section 76-6-405, Utah Code, defining and describing 
the actual substantive offense of "theft by deception", 
provides: 
(1) A person commits theft if he obtains or 
exercises control over property of another by 
deception and with a purpose to deprive him 
thereof. 
(2) Theft by deception does not occur, 
however, when there is only falsity as to 
matters having no pecuniary significance, or 
puffing by statements unlikely to deceive 
ordinary persons in the group addressed. 
"Puffing" means an exaggerated commendation of 
wares or worth in communications addressed to 
the public or to a class or group. 
Emphasis added. Two observations are in order. First, 
it is apparent that "theft by deception" presupposes an 
almost "economic" status to the transaction (i.e. an 
"economic" or "financial" component to the basic 
transaction, as evidenced by either the exchange of 
actual economic value i.e. money or economic 
equivalent or by the expectation to receive economic 
value as a result of the transaction) , or, (2) in cases 
where the actual property so transferred has 
recognizable "economic" or monetary value. Neither is 
present in the instant case. 
That City officials surrendered to the Defendant 
the files and allowed him to inspect the same is not 
"theft by deception". It was his absolute statutory 
right to inspect such public records. See, for example, 
Section 10-3-603 and Section 63-2-201, Utah Code. There 
was NO "deception" in obtaining those files, for public 
inspection, when such files were contained with the 
City Hall and for which the Defendant later left to pay 
the City Treasurer for copies of the very records he 
had inspected. [His payment for those copies also 
negates any mens rea required for "theft".] 
It is also noteworthy that whereas the Information 
charging the Defendant with the two offense recites 
what appears to be the statutory text for the offense, 
omits subparagraph (2) which specifies when theft by 
deception does NOT occur. 
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the 
proscribed conduct was that "Mr Decker implicitly 
promised to return all the 'public records' documents 
surrendered to him", that conduct does not facially 
contain the required "deception", because there was 
"only falsity as to matters having no pecuniary 
significance"! As Ms Gleed described, his getting the 
photographs mixed up with the other documents on the 
table which has an otherwise explainable (and 
innocent) explanation is not probative, particularly 
"beyond a reasonable doubt", of the Defendant's guilt 
of "theft by deception". 
Utah law requires that there be "reliance" in 
"theft by deception" cases. In State vs Jones, 657 P. 2d 
1263 (Utah Supreme Court 1982), the Utah Supreme Court 
wrote: 
It is clear from the face of the statute 
that reliance by the victim is an element of 
the crime of theft by deception. In context, 
obtaining property "by deception" can only 
mean "by means of deception." Deception, 
followed by transfer of property to the 
deceiver, does not add up to theft by 
deception without the causal element of 
reliance. Even though the alleged victim is 
deceived, if he does not rely on the deception 
in parting with his property, there has been 
no theft "by deception". State v. Vatsis, 10 
Utah 2d 244, 246-47. 351 P.2d 96, 97-98 (1960) 
(involving statutory predecessor of §76-6-
405(1), which also contained no express 
reference to "reliance")/ State v. Finch, 223 
Kan. 398, 573 P.2d 1048 (1978). 
657 P.2d at 1267. Emphasis added. 
Ms Candace Gleed the West Valley City employee 
who had surrendered temporary custody of the "case 
file" to Mr Decker for him to inspect the same 
affirmatively testified THERE WAS NO DECEPTION on her 
part associated with Mr Decker's receiving the "file" 
containing the photographs. Ms Gleed testified: 
Q (by Mr BRADFORD [Defense Counsel]): Well, 
whatever he did, he didn't deceive you, did 
he? 
A (by Ms GLEED): I believe he did. 
Q: How? 
A: In that he was putting those photographs 
in between the directories while I was 
standing right there, in an attempt to take 
them. 
Q: That didn't deceive you. You saw what he 
did. 
A: Yeah, he didn't know that I saw it. 
Q: Sure. So, he didn't deceive you. You 
watched him. 
A: He tried to. 
Q: Well, but he didn't. 
A: No, he didn't. 
Mr BRADFORD: Thank you. 
TRANSCRIPT at Page 86, lines 12 thru 25. RECORD at 70. 
Emphasis added. 
When the prosecution's own witness testifies that 
there was "no deception", the trial court's finding is 
not supported by the evidence. The conviction cannot 
stand! 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant has been unfairly prejudiced by the 
prosecutions repeated failure to provide the "bill of 
particulars", specifically describing the items of 
property alleged to have been stolen or attempted to 
have been stolen. This failure resulted in the 
Defendant misled by the "open file" disclosure as to 
the prosecutor's theory defending against charges 
exactly opposite of what the trial court judge found 
him guilty of! This judicial result could not have 
happened, were the trial court judge to have been 
informed as to what the prosecutor was attempting to 
prove. 
The trial court's refusal to grant the timely-
demanded "jury trial", for these serious misdemeanor 
offenses, is unjustified. The Rules do not require the 
Defendant to "reconfirm" his "demand". The trial 
court's failure to properly convene the jury when the 
"jury trial" had been so scheduled for months did 
deprive the defendant of his rights. 
The "dual" convictions (i.e. of both offenses) is 
clearly precluded by the "single criminal episode" 
statute. Furthermore, the status of the confusing 
evidence is such that the trial court's own findings 
evidence the prosecution's failure to prove the 
accused's guilt "beyond a reasonable doubt". 
The prosecution has, in this case, the burden of 
showing that the failure to provide the requested bill 
of particulars was not "harmless" error. 
The verdict is not supported by the evidence. 
During the trial there was introduced no evidence 
"strongly corroborative" of the accused mental state as 
to when he was handling the photographs. Furthermore, 
the telephone books were "for free" distribution. The 
Defendant's taking of the books cannot be the basis of 
a criminal conviction. 
The Defendant's conviction of both offenses should 
be set aside. The case should be remanded to the 
District Court for a jury trial, following the 
providing of a "bill of particulars" identifying the 
property in question. In the alternative, the charges 
should be dismissed, outright, as the prosecution 
simply failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
Respectfully submitted this 12th day of July, 1999. 
Attorney for Appellant 
JAMES WESTON DECKER 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I certify that I caused two copies of the foregoing 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF to be mailed, first-class postage 
prepaid, to Mr Elliot R Lawrence, Attorney at Law, 
Office of the West Valley City Attorney, 3600 South 
Constitution Boulevard, West Valley City, Utah 84119, 
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Keith L. Stonev (3868) 
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John W.Huber (7226) 
West Valley City Prosecutors 
3600 Constitution Boulevard 
West Valley City, Utah 841 \{) 
(801)963-3331 
IN THE THIRD DISI nu r COURT,s i \ n ; OF UTAH 
SALTLAkL< O' V* Y. wr.s'l VALLLY Dl-rAKTMMM' 
STATE OF UTAH (West Valley < ">«> > 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JAMES WESTON DECKER 
3247 WEST 3650 SOUTH 
WEST VALLEY CITY U I SI j I o 
10/02/50 
Defendant. 
The undersigned, David L.Clark, inula- <>;i»h, states on information and belief Ilia! the 
defendant, on or about 69/W7W, ill ihc\icmit\ of 3M)0 SOUTH r o w i T n T f O N iMA'V West 
Valley City, Utah, did unlawfully commit tin; ciimc(s) of: 
COUNT 1: Attempted Theft. 76-6-404 << bss < ). r .c .A. 1'*5.\ as :nnnMlni. 
A person commits theft if he obtains o? evrrises nnautho» i/< ^ rontna <w <<?• MM p ^ p r r h ^ 
another with a purpose to deprive hio» <!*""<>'. 
76-6-412. Theft - Classification. 
(1) Theft of property and services shall he punishable as follows: 
(d) as a class B misdemeanor if (he valnc of the property stolen is less than S3^o. 
COUNT 2: Theft by Deception. 7"~'»~M5 fCkiss Po. U.C.A. U^3, as ame<ole<k 
(1) A person commits theft if he nj>f;>i»»s m «>\r»-rises control <o IT p» nn- r^ of :nM»f her fn ('r^piion 
and with a purpose to deprive him thcrmk 
76-6-412. Theft - Classification. 
(1) Theft of property and services shall !>«• punishable: 
(d) as a class B misdemeanor U ihv value <>! the property stolen is »<>ss than S3tM>. 
Hi is information is based on fhe evidence obtained from (he follow me, witnesses: 
MIKEL BIRCH 
! \ H ) l O l \ T l t ) \ 
Conn No. ' 1 ^ 1 \ \;.\ r\r:- r^ \.w^ 
CANDACE GLEED 
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT: 
Your affiant is informed by West Valley Report No. 98-1 1931 and the above named witnesses as 
follows: 
WITNESS STATED THAT 'I III* I >EFENDANT E\TR( ISI'D CONTROL OVER THE 
PROPERTY OF WEST VALLEY ORDINANCE ENFORCEMENT BY TAKING TWO TELEPHONE 
BOOKS HE HAD ATTEMPTED TO HIDE PHOTOGRAPIIS IN TIIAT BELONGED TO 
ORDINANCE ENFORCEMENT; DEFENDANT WITHOUT NIL PERMISSION OF WEST VALLEY 
ORDINANCE, CONCEALED PHOTOGRAPHS IN BETWEEN TWO PHONE BOOKS, AND 
ATTEMPTED TO LEAVE WITH SAME. 
DATED this fj. day of //UA , 1998 
^fe 
David L. Clark 
98-11931, SU, March 09, 1498 
ADDENDUM 1 
PAftF 1 n c O nAi 
: i I'* 
JASON R. RAMMELL 7 287 
LARSEN & RAMMELL 
Attorney for Defendant 
3600 South Market St., 100 
West Valley City, Utah 84119, 
Telephone: 964-1200 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT 
ooOoo 
WEST VALLEY CITY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
REQUEST FOR BILL 
OF PARTICULARS 
JAMES W. DECKER, : Case No. 981101080 
Judge Ann Boyden 
Defendant. : 
ooOoo 
COMES NOW James W. Decker, by and through his attorney, 
Jason R. Rammell, pursuant to URCrP Rule 4 and hereby files a 
Request For a bill of Particulars to assist in understanding nature 
and cause of the charges herein and assist the Defendant in 
preparation of his defense as follows: 
1 . What is the specific property alleged to have been 
stolen by the Defendant in Count I of the Information filed herein? 
2. What is the specific property alleged to have been 
stolen by the Defendant in Count II of the Information filed 
herein? 
3. What is the specific allegation of deception with 
which the Defendant is charged in Count II of the Information filed 
herein? 
ADDENDUM 2 
-=>"^> DATED this- ^  day of V . .
 s , 1998. 
JASON R. RAMMELL 
"Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This will certify that on the day of 
1998, a true and correct copy of Request for bill of Particulars, 
was mailed, postage prepaid, *o the West Valley City Prosecutor at 
3600 Constitution Blvd., West Valley City, Utah 84119 
L - -. • 
ADDENDUM 2 
W E S T V A L L l i I ^ i i i ^ x x w * _ 
FENDANTNAME TytAYy JuA e 
D 1 Z 7 7 : < - L L a. J v i 
IIMINAL RECORD YES • NO D DL# 
DOB JCZ <f RACE C S E X / u 
H PHONF W PHONE ~*-~ , " / W 
ALIAS 
SEH'HIIDTDATE 
- OFFENSE INFORMATION -
ApD '? ^ 9 / 
REENINGOFC ^ - c , f { ^ c v <^£ ^ DATE SUBMITTED j l j ^ l 
(RESTING OFC ASSISTING OFC 
WE % CA^yki G&C,J 
)DRESS 3 ^ 5" A , . ^ ^ , J J 
-VICTIM INFORMATION - , 
SEX £ DOB A/,) H-PHONE 
W-PHONE 961 Z&r 1 
WITNESS INFORMATION 
\ME /YMtClL &l£cA AGEJJ5 CODE H # w#9,f?.&V7 
lyfrux 
\ME AGE CODE H# W# 
)D 
<VME AGE CODE H # W # 
3D 
wnesroFC e-AsasT a <? 
P^ 
W ^ Y E W a ^ S S l-pOPf HI WITNESS a-coMf^ f OTH6R WONGS* 
• ii ml niHiU*+U»immmt*mA 
CHARQE(S)' WARRANT • (INCLUDBPC STATEMENT) SUMMONS • 
ikttT; to ik«/~^ ^ r^QDE 76 -6 y W ' CLASS £ FILED 
_ffiE fg / . c l « ^ CODE 7^ b W CLASS C FILED 
DECL K.B-
DECL K B -
CODE^VK i-/i4i. CLASS FILED DEcT KB-
X CODE CLASS FILED DECL KB S 
CB or DECLINE REASONS* DATE 
OFFICER'S RESPONSE- DATE 
CASE NARRATIVE A ^ / W tortftS. „\^rcr>rfr ^., A.CZ £/if ^ V v w H d ^ O 
^ 5 ^ PrtuWAWr/s &A.«. JHT. r ^ l ]fr PlAiAf, / ) / » /fr-y . f . J 7. .J4 hlb\i. dtiM 
P^r. > U t g , t / 7 3 / to Jimo? It'll -AAS/C^ J-J'll. 
T,I~ A^rrArrUy^ 
WARRANT-P.C. STATEMENT: 
ADDENDUM 3 VERS 12 AntUffi! 
PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGE 
«-A J> 
JAMES W DECKER 
Defendant Pro Se 
3247 West Lancer Way 
West Valley City, Utah 84119 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY 
WEST VALLEY CITY'DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
WEST VALLEY CITY, 
Plaintiff 
vs 
JAMES W DECKER, 
Defendant 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Case No. 98-1101080 
The undersigned, as Defendant Pro Se, hereby demands that the 
criminal charges in the above-entitled action be tried by jury. 
Respectfully submitted this 8th day of September, 1998. 
JAMES W DECKER 
Defendant Pro Se 
CERTIFICATE 
I certify that I caused a copy of the foregoing DEMAND FOR JURY 
TRIAL to be mailed to Mr David Clark, Assistant City Attorney, West 
Valley City Attorney's Office, 3600'South Constitution Boulevard, 




I NUMBER 981101080 Other Misdemeanor 
Clerk: sandeeb 
Prosecutor: DAVID CLARK 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): L. BRUCE LARSEN 
* 
Audio ^ -..N 
T^pe Number: 17636*^ Tape Count: 5890 
Deft present with counsel, ncK^esolution case set for Jury Tri 
Defendant stated that he will s^k own counsel. Bruce Larsen 
motioned for withdrawel of cqungely motion granted 
JURY TRIAL is scheduled. 
Date: 11/04/1998 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
Location: SECOND FLOOR 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
\ 3636 SOUTH 2700 WEST 
"\, WEST VALLEY, UT 84119 
before Judge ANN BOYDEN 
•20-98 Filed: Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel-Larsen & Rammell 
-08-98 Filed: Renewed Motion to Dismiss (prosecutorial Failure to 
Provide Requested Bill of Particulars)-James W Decker 
-08-98 Filed: Demand for Jury Trial-James W Decker 
-09-98 Filed: Plaintiffs Objection to Defendant's Request for A Bill 
of Particulars 
-21-98 Filed: Plaintiff's Objection To Defendant's Renewed Motion To 
Dismiss 
-07-98 AB/cce Court orders Defendant's motion to dismiss - denied. 
Because plaintiff has informed defendant of the nature and cause 







the defendant, & has made evidence available to defendant 
-07-98 there is no basis in law or fact to dismiss case for lack of 
Bill of Particulars. 
-07-98 Filed: Notice to Submit for Decision - J Decker 
1-07-98 Filed: Notice to Submit for Decision-James W Decker 
1-07-98 Note: Defendant contacted clerk by phone regarding motion. 





cindye mailed to defendant this date, 
Filed: Motion Notice And Order For Continuance - Keith L Stoney carole 
AB/SAB deft phoned this date regarding jury, clerk told Mr, 
Decker that the continuance was nat granted and a jury was not 
called because of timelyness, sandee 
Filed: Motion , notice and order for continuance barbar 
AB/cce Def was contacted this date to determine if a resolution 
had been reached on this case or if a jury still needed to be 
filed, Def stated that he had relied on the city's motion which 
stated that the case had been continued and was not cindye 
1-03-98 prepared to go forward. Def was informed that the city had 
withdrawn the motion and the case would go forward. Def stated 
J - 1 4 - 9 8 
L - 0 3 - 9 8 
L-03-98 
L - 0 3 - 9 8 
iv-i«4-oH. 0 9 / 2 4 / 9 9 1 6 : 4 0 : 0 8 ADDENDUM 5 
Page 5 DAP.C 
BOYDEN 
HD FLOOR—-
0 AM 1 JURY TRIAL 
WEST VALLEY CITY 
VS. DECKER, JAMES WESTON 
OTN: DOB /02/1950 
MC - THEFT 
MB - THEFT BY DECEPTION 
DOB 10-2-50 
November U4, «: 
WednescU 
WVC 981101080 Other Misdemeanoi 
ATTY: 
ATTY: LARSEN, L. BRUCE 
NO OTN NUMBER 
llLi .M3L 
2 JURY TRIAL 
WEST VALLEY CITY 
VS. MOWER, JEAN FRANCIS 
MA - THEFT 
DOB: 10-17-97 
WVC 981100340 Other Misdemeanoi 
ATTY: 
ATTY: 
NO OTN NUMBER 
MlMzn-.fM:lM Ml 
3 JURY TRIAL 
WEST VALLEY CITY 
VS. PIENEZZA, JOSEPH ROBINSON 
OTN: 848975 DOB: 06/25/1979 
WVP 971003766 Other Misdemeanoi 
ATTY: 
ATTY: 
MB - SIMPLE ASSAULT 
MB - CRIMINAL MISCHIEF 
MB - CARRYING CONCEALED DANGEROUS WEAPON 
DOB 6 - 2 5 - 7 9 
hJM±2M]L.^L3l.ll. Ml 
ADDENDUM 6 
* « • % ! - 4 r^c <y D A O C 
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution 
provides in relevant part: 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall 
have the right to appear and defend in person 
and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause 
of the accusation against him, to have a copy 
thereof, . . . 
Emphasis added. 
ADDENDUM 7 
Section 76-4-101, Utah Code 
Attempt Elements of offense 
(1) For purposes of this part a person is guilty of 
an attempt to commit a crime if, acting with the 
kind of culpability otherwise required for the 
commission of the offense, he engages in conduct 
constituting a substantial step toward commission of 
the offense. 
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct does not 
constitute a substantial step unless it is strongly 
corroborative of the actor's intent to commit the 
offense. 
(3) No defense to the offense of attempt shall 
arise: 
(a) because the offense attempted was 
actually committed; or 
(b) due to factual or legal impossibility 
if the offense could have been committed 
had the attendant circumstances been as the 
actor believed them to be. 
ADDENDUM 8 
Section 76-1-402, Utah Code 
Separate offenses arising out of single criminal 
episode Included offenses 
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single 
criminal action for all separate offenses arising 
out of a single criminal episode; however, when the 
same act of a defendant under a single criminal 
episode shall establish offenses which may be 
punished in different ways under different 
provisions of this code, the act shall be punishable 
under only one such provision; an acquittal or 
conviction and sentence under any such provision 
bars prosecution under any other such provision. 
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses 
under a single criminal episode, unless the court 
otherwise orders to promote justice, a defendant 
shall not be subject to separate trials for multiple 
offenses when: 
(a) The offenses are within the 
jurisdiction of a single court; and 
(b) The offenses are known to the 
prosecuting attorney at the time the 
defendant is arraigned on the first 
information or indictment. 
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense 
included in the offense charged but may not be 
convicted of both the offense charged and the 
included offense. An offense is so included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same 
or less than all the facts required to 
establish the commission of the offense 
charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, 
solicitation, conspiracy, or form of 
preparation to commit the offense charged 
or an offense otherwise included therein; 
or 
(c) It is specifically designated by a 
statute as a lesser included offense. 
ADDENDUM 9 
* A C <t D A < ^ C 
Section 76-6-405, Utah Code, defining and describing 
the actual substantive offense of "theft by deception", 
provides: 
(1) A person commits theft if he obtains or 
exercises control over property of another by 
deception and with a purpose to deprive him 
thereof. 
(2) Theft by deception does not occur, 
however, when there is only falsity as to 
matters having no pecuniary significance, or 
puffing by statements unlikely to deceive 
ordinary persons in the group addressed. 
"Puffing" means an exaggerated commendation of 
wares or worth in communications addressed to 
the public or to a class or group. 
Emphasis added. 
ADDENDUM 10 
»-* / * •> r* <f ^ c 1 DAHP 
Rule 4, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides, in 
relevant part: 
(b) An indictment or information shall charge 
the offense for which the defendant is being 
prosecuted by using the name given to the 
offense by common law or by statute or by 
stating in concise terms the definition of the 
offense sufficient to give the defendant 
notice of the charge. An information may 
contain or be accompanied by a statement of 
facts sufficient to make out probable cause to 
sustain the offense charged where appropriate. 
Such things as time, place, means, intent, 
manner, value and ownership need not be 
alleged, unless necessary to charge the 
offense. Such things as money, securities, 
written instruments, pictures, statutes and 
judgments may be described by any name or 
description by which they are generally known 
or by which they be identified without setting 
forth a copy. However, details concerning such 
things may be obtained through a bill of 
particulars. Neither presumptions of law nor 
matters of judicial notice need be stated. 
(e) When facts not set out in an information 
or indictment are required to inform a 
defendant of the nature and cause of the 
offense charged, so as to enable him to 
prepare his defense, the defendant may file a 
written motion for a bill of particulars. The 
motion shall be filed at arraignment or within 
ten days thereafter, or at such later time as 
the court may permit. The court may, on its 
own motion, direct the filing of a bill of 
particulars. A bill of particulars may be 
amended or supplemented at any time subject to 
such conditions as justice may require. The 
request for and contents of a bill of 
particulars shall be limited to a statement of 
factual information needed to set forth the 
essential elements of the particular offense 
charged. 
Emphasis added. 
ADDENDUM 11 
